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JURISPRUDENCE OF HISTORY AND TRUTH
William P. LaPiana*
I.

INTRODUCTION

For some years, scholarly inquiry into the nature of late nineteenth
century American legal thought has been dominated by Duncan Kennedy's description of "classical" legal thought, so-named because it
"amounted to a rationalistic ordering of the whole legal universe." '
Kennedy places special emphasis on the integrated nature of classical
thought. Certain key concepts, such as liberty of contract, are considered to
supply answers to all sorts of legal questions.' This concept of integration,
with its necessary implication that the process of legal judgment is a
mechanistic application of unavoidable precepts, justifies the description
of this sort of legal reasoning as "formalistic." 3
The idea of classical formalism is also related to the instrumental
interpretation of antebellum legal thought. That interpretation asserts
that antebellum judges self-consciously manipulated common law doctrine to promote economic development at the expense of fairness and
equity.' In the final chapter of The Transformation of American Law,
Morton Horwitz hypothesizes that once the changes favorable to capitalists made possible by instrumentalism were put into place, courts turned to
a more formalistic approach to forestall any attempt to modify the results
of instrumentalism in favor of greater distributive justice. In short, having
accomplished their goal using a theory of law holding that judges could
truly make legal rules, judges returned to the idea that they only applied
* William P. LaPiana is Associate Professor of Law at New York Law School where
he has taught since 1987. He holds the A.B., summa cum laude, the A.M. in history, the
J.D., cum laude, and the Ph.D. in history from Harvard University. He thanks the members
of the Legal History Colloquium at New York University Law School under the leadership
of William E. Nelson and John P. Reid for help and encouragement in the project of which
this article is a part and his colleague Edward A. Purcell, Jr. for his comments. This article is
dedicated to the memory of Jerry Armstrong.
1. Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understandingof Legal Consciousness:
The Case of ClassicalLegal Thought in America, 1850-1940, in 3 RESEARCH IN LAW AND

3 (Rita J. Simon & Steven Spitzer eds., 1980).
2. Id. at 19-21.
3. Charles C. Goetsch, The Future of Legal Formalism, 24 AM. J. L. HIST. 221
(1980). See also, CHARLES C. GOETSCH, ESSAYS ON SIMEON E. BALDWIN 87-92 (1980).
4. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
SOCIOLOGY

1-30 (1977).
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existing rules in order to prevent law from becoming a tool to vindicate
those oppressed by the legal structure that instrumentalism created.5
Both classical formalism and instrumentalism are related to older
views of the period. Roscoe Pound established his reputation, at least in
part, by arguing against the "mechanical jurisprudence" of the late
nineteenth century and advocating its replacement by sociological jurisprudence.' After the Second World War, Morton White's Revolt Against
Formalismfound the originality of twentieth century thought in its attack
on rigid, rule-oriented explanations of social phenomena in many different
disciplines, including law.7 Other scholarly work contemporary with
White's emphasized the extent to which legal ideas served dominant
economic interests, thus perpetuating hostility against the claims of labor
and providing the justification for striking down much-needed reform in
the name of substantive due process and freedom of contract.8 Indeed,
Duncan Kennedy's contribution to twentieth century interpretive theory is
his drawing together of the two older approaches. In his analysis, the
formalist structure is dictated by its attempt to promote and defend
acquisitive bourgeois individualism. 9
Herbert Hovenkamp has put forward yet another interpretation of the
nature of late nineteenth century American jurisprudence. He explains the
appeal of substantive due process by showing its relationship to the ideas of
economics which were part of the general intellectual culture of educated
Americans, including judges. These economic ideas shaped the unexpressed policy decisions behind various applications of substantive due
process.10
These commentators on the state of American legal thought in the
Gilded Age all agreed that what needs to be explained is the law's, or
perhaps more accurately, the judges' approach to questions of wealth
5. Id. at 253-66 (Horwitz marks 1850 as the point in time where our legal system had
transformed to favor capitalism).
6. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908);
Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, (pt. 1, 2 & 3) 24
HARV. L. REV. 591 (1910), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1911).
7. MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1957).
8. See, e.g., CHARLES G. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 122-65
(1930); CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS (1954); BENJAMIN R. TwIss,
LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT

(1962).

9. Duncan Kennedy, The Structureof Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV.
205 (1979).
10. See, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1837-1937, at
171-82 (1991).
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distribution. While Kennedy and Horwitz attempt to link the desire to
accomplish certain social ends with certain styles of legal thought,
Hovenkamp and perhaps White are content to try to describe ideas which
may have contributed to certain results. In any event, these discussions are
primarily attempts to write intellectual history. They are attempts to
elucidate the ideas that inform formal discourse which, in the case of the
opinions of the courts, creates economic winners and losers.
This Article is another example of intellectual history which attempts
to illuminate an aspect of legal thought in the Gilded Age. Part I is
concerned with ideas about law itself, ideas which are similar enough to
warrant grouping them together and setting them against other ideas
about the nature of law. Those other ideas represent analytical jurisprudence. They are bound together by some degree of acceptance of positivistic views of law, i.e., of John Austin's assertions that law should be
separated from morality at least for purposes of study and that all law is
directly or indirectly the command of the sovereign.1 1 The ideas examined
here represent the opposition to analytical jurisprudence.
Part II describes the general state of legal theory in the public
exchange among lawyers, professors, and jurisprudents. This section shows
the tension between historical jurisprudence, which asserts that law is best
understood as an organic growth intimately related to the nature of a just
society, and analytical jurisprudence, which asserts that the proper subject
of legal study is legal principles in action without reference to the morality
of those principles. According to analytical jurisprudence, law is accurately defined not as a system of principles drawing their authority from
their conformity with the ultimate good, but rather as the commands of the
sovereign which, at least in the common law world, are seen in the decisions
of the courts. Part II also describes some of the historical circumstances
which exacerbated this tension by linking it to important political questions. The thinkers discussed in Part II, however, carried on the debate in
terms which reflected about the nature of law consistent with legal thought
which dominated the pre-Civil War period's beliefs. They approached law
as an inductive Baconian science, much as Joseph Story did, without
becoming too explicit about the source of the principles.
Part III discusses another group of legal thinkers: William G.
Hammond, Thomas McIntyre Cooley, Philemon Bliss, Christopher G.
Tiedeman, Edward J. Phelps, John F. Dillon, and James C. Carter, who
battled analytical jurisprudence in a different way. They attempted to
establish a self-consciously scientific argument for viewing law as a system
11. See,

JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED

(1954).
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of broad general principles resting ultimately on custom, which most of
them believed to be based on Henry Maine's contributions to legal thought.
None of these thinkers took exactly the same route to the common goal, but
there are sufficient similarities among them to identify them all with a
single view of the nature of law, i.e., that a scientific understanding of the
past leads ineluctably to a law of unchanging principles.
Part IV concludes that joining the belief that law is ultimately the
product of great transcendent principles with an inductive view of legal
science leads to a particular view of the judicial function. In this view, the
province of judges is to apply the great principles to the cases before them.
The best source of great principles is the common law, which has grown up
with the people it governs and embodies legal truth far better than any
positive law, even the Constitution. This belief has the practical effect of
declaring illegitimate any legislative attempt to redistribute wealth and is
the ultimate bulwark against the growth of socialism. Part IV suggests that
an understanding of legal thought in the Gilded Age must be closely linked
to the general intellectual history of that period. It questions the adequacy
of any single theory to explain all aspects of the life of the law by showing
that some of the writers modified their views over time. Finally, it hopes to
recall the student to the need to examine biography. Even now, a century
later, the legal community is still confronted with these issues. It must
address the relationship between moral absolutes and law, the malleability
of legal standards in the hands of legislatures, and the most fitting role for
the judge in a democratic society.

II.

HISTORY VS. ANALYSIS

History has long been a part of the common law. Any use of precedent
implicates history to some degree, linking legal technique with a study of
the past. In particular, English common law had a special relationship to
the English past. The law was the great opponent of Stuart tyranny and
embodied an entire history of liberty.1 2 Jeremy Bentham questioned these
easy assumptions loudly and relentlessly. As early as 1840, the Scottish
lawyer James Reddie identified two distinct schools of jurisprudence, the
analytical and the historical, identifying the former with Bentham and the
latter with Hugo and Savigny.13 Henry Maine's Ancient Law, published in
12. J.G.A. PococK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW (1987);
GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 3-80 (1986); JOHN
PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHOR-

ITY OF RIGHTS (1986) (provides exhaustive illustration of the link between a history of
liberty and the common law).

13. The result of the more correct views of law, as a science, which thus came to be
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1861, is generally regarded as the first thorough discussion in English of the
idea that current legal doctrine reflects long dead social arrangements.
James Fitzjames Stephen reviewed Maine's work together with John
Austin's recently republished introduction to analytical jurisprudence,
The Province of JurisprudenceDetermined, describing the former as a
representative of historical school and the latter as representing the
analytical. Stephen, a lawyer and sometime government official who
published widely on what we would describe as political science, believed
14
that both approaches were useful in attempting to understand the law.
Similar views could occasionally be found in the United States. In
1890, John F. Dillon told the Ohio State Bar Association that there is truth
in both "the Analytical and Historical schools of jurisprudence," and "that
properly understood the two schools are not antagonistic but complementary, and that the true course is to combine the logical or analytical with the
historical and experimental, the former mainly supplying the form, the
latter mainly supplying the matter for a revised, improved and systematic
Jurisprudence."' 15
However, bland acceptance of a multitude of approaches was not the
usual response to what in the United States, at least, was a confrontation
between analytical and historical jurisprudence. Some American commentators saw Ancient Law as an exemplary use of history to correct
Austin's errors. For example, William G. Hammond, whose thought is
examined in Part III, lamented that during Austin's sojourn in Germany,
he fell completely "under the influence of the so-called philosophical school
of jurists" and therefore had ignored the historical school, lead by
Savigny.'6 Had the situation been reversed, "the study of scientific
jurisprudence in England might have reached, a generation earlier, the
point to which it has later been brought under the guidance of jurists like
' 7
Sir Henry Maine.'
entertained towards the close of the eighteenth century, in the different countries of
Europe, has been the establishment of the two great modern schools or sects, into
which the scientific students of law throughout Europe, appear to be divided, and
which have been termed, by the continental jurists, the analytical school, of which
Mr. Bentham may be called the founder, and the historical school, which is chiefly
prevalent in Germany, and of which Professors Hugo and Savigny are the great
leaders.
50
(photo reprint, 1982) (1840). See WILLIAM L. MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN 148 (1982).
14. Stephen's review is summarized in MORISON, supra note 13, at 148-51.
15. John F. Dillon, Bentham and his School of Jurisprudence, 24 AM. L. REv. 746
(1890).
16. See William G. Hammond, John Austin and His Wife, I GREEN BAG 47 (1889).
17. Id. Modern scholarship indicates that Austin was not ignorant of the historical

JAMES REDDIE, INQUIRES ELEMENTARY AND HISTORICAL IN THE SCIENCE OF LAW
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What frightened some nineteenth century American lawyers about
Austin's work is not hard to pin down. First, Austin contended that law
could and should be separated from morality at least for purposes of study.
Second, he argued that all law is directly or indirectly the command of the
sovereign. As already mentioned, both of these were not original ideas of
Austin. Jeremy Bentham advocated similar views of the common law. The
notion that power is the ultimate source of law can be traced to Hobbes."8
However, American lawyers tended to ascribe these notions to Austin,
finding their most important expression in his lectures. The posthumous
volumes of Austin's lectures were both compact and complete. In contrast,
Bentham's writings were scattered and when finally collected, quite bulky.
Bentham was often regarded as a crank, or at least eccentric, with a
reputation for taking an unconventional approach to the sanctities of home
and family. 9 Austin was a proper Victorian who held a formal academic
appointment, even though he could not make a success of it. 20 The
historical circumstances of the time greatly influenced the public perception of both Bentham's and Austin's views. The publication of Austin's
lectures during the Civil War ensured them both of an American audience.
Austin had much tosay about sovereignty, and Americans had much to ask
as they warred over the nature of the federal union. However complex its
pedigree, the idea that "everything which the so-called supreme power of
the State commands, whatever its character in point of right, is law, and
nothing else is entitled to that designation," was associated by American
lawyers with Austin.2
A.

Declaratory Theory
Many of the lawyers who made that association were quite opposed to

school ofjurisprudence during his stay at the University of Bonn in late 1827 and early 1828
and in fact studied with a privatim docens who was himself a disciple of the historical
school. MORISON, supra note 13, at 17-20.
18. POSTEMA, supra note 12, at 46-60.
19. A typical judgment on Bentham is exemplified by James C. Carter. See James C.
Carter, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law, 13 A.B.A. REP. 217 (1890). In this annual
address before the ABA Carter labelled Bentham a "crank - a man who cherishes his pet
theories in the solitude of his own contemplations, and disdains both the observation of the
present and the study of the past." Id. at 244.
20. The importance of the propriety of Austin's life and of the sentimental aspects of
his story can be seen in Hammond, supranote 16, at 47-53, which combines careful analysis
of Austin's ideas with lavish praise for the selfless devotion of Sarah Austin whose efforts to
see her husband's unpublished writings through the press are portrayed as the result of
proper self-abnegation.
21. The formulation is that of JAMES C. CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH, AND
FUNCTION

12 (1907).
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Austin's ideas. They maintained that the common law was not merely a
command of the sovereign, but rather was a body of principles beyond the
vagaries of government and opinion, which, in conformity with classic
common law theory, judges discovered rather than created.2 2 In one sense
the strength of this idea in the post-Civil War era represents a continuation
of the approach to law which dominated the antebellum period. The idea of
Baconian legal science rested on the belief that cases were data from which
the careful legal scientist could induce the true principles of law inherent in
creation.2 3 As strife over slavery increased, it became more difficult for
jurists to find support for the moral unity of the law. In addition, procedural
reforms abolishing the common law forms of action undermined the
practical unity and coherence of the law that lawyers worked with every
day.24 Finally, Jacksonian notions of equality and governmental neutrality
tended to make judicial expressions of ultimate truth less palatable. This
tendency was reinforced by the replacement of an appointed judiciary with
an elected one.2 5
In any such event, talk of the moral coherence of the common law did
not cease. In 1856 George van Santvoord, whose treatise on the New York
Code of Civil Procedure demonstrated how important facts had become to
the practice of law, told the graduating class at the University of Albany
Law School that law was a Baconian science "laid broad and deep upon
those universal principles of natural justice which the cultivated reason of
all ages has sought to apply to human affairs in the almost infinitely
diversified relations of man to his fellow man, to society, and to civil
government." 2" The goal of the legal scientist, according to van Santvoord,
should be the creation of "a complete system of jurisprudence, founded
upon broad, rational and universal principles of natural justice and
truth."2 7 He asserted, therefore, that precedents are only the evidence of
22. For an excellent summary of the traditional common law view of the judicial role,
summed up in the maxim, traced to Coke, that judex ist lex loquens - the judge is the
mouthpiece of the law, see POSTEMA, supra note 12, at 9-11.
23. See generally William P. LaPiana, Swift v. Tyson and the Brooding Omnipresence in the Sky: An Investigation of the Idea of Law in Antebellum America, 20 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 771 (1986).
24. William P. LaPiana, Just the Facts: The Field Code and the Case Method, 36
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 287 (1991).
25. Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the
Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW AND HIST. REV. 293
(1985).
26. GEORGE VAN SANTVOORD, THE STUDY OF LAW AS A SCIENCE 7 (1856).
27. Id. at 14.
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law and if such precedents are wrong, they should be ignored, presumably
in favor of those universal principles which are the law. 8
Theodore Dwight, a great advocate of the teaching of legal principles,
separated these principles from the power of the state in his inaugural
lecture at Columbia in 1858. He told his students that the judge does not
originate law, rather "he can only pronounce it, and that after argument,
and when the precise point is involved." 2 9 Thus the law is "ascertainedby
judicial decisions," not made by them, and a code should not originate law
but rather aggregate, select and arrange the principles exemplified by the
30
cases.
This belief in legal principles which transcended the vagaries of
politics and adjudication survived the Civil War. An extreme expression of
this view can be found in Henry Nicoll's graduation address to the
Columbia class of 1869. 31 He told the graduates that law is "absolute truth
• . . the expression of those great principles of eternal justice which the
Almighty has ordained -. revealing them through the consciences of men
- and which are unchangeable because they are the truth. '32 Nicoll
followed his definition of law with a remarkably catholic description of the
sources of the principles. Whether we call them Divine law, or positive
morality (Austin's phrase), "or whether they spring from the doctrine of
'the greatest utility' it matters not." 33 These principles are law higher than
human enactment. The attempt to accommodate such divergent positions
as God-given natural law and utilitarianism shows Nicoll's determination
to maintain the separation of law from politics. He did not maintain,
however, that law as it exists is always an accurate reflection of eternal
justice.
Nicoll maintained that the actual state of the law cannot be understood without a knowledge of the times in which certain rules of law were
framed. A study of history will reveal that "state policy," another name for
politics, is the origin of that which "mars the harmony and symmetry of the
28. Id. at 35.
29. Theodore W. Dwight, An Introductory Lecture Delivered before the Law Class of
Columbia College, New York 25 (1859).
30. Id. at 3, 43.
31. Nicoll was a prominent New York practitioner who played an important role in
organizing the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Nicoll resigned from the Bar
in disgrace in January, 1875 after misappropriating funds. GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND
CONFLICTS: THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, 1870-1970, at 128 (1970).

32. Henry Nicoll, An Address delivered before the Graduating Class of the Law
School of Columbia College 5 (1869).
33. Id. at 5-6.
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law.""' He uses the law of real estate as an example which he asserts is "not
founded on the principles of right reason as now understood but on what
those grim old barons of four or five centuries ago regarded as such when
looked upon from their own selfish standpoint." 35 Nicoll thus set up a
dichotomy with law as the expression of eternal justice on one side, and law
as debased by politics and "state policy" on the other.
The attempt to divide politics and law was an important aspect of the
post-Civil War revival of the belief in unchanging principles of law. The
works of Joel Bishop, a leading treatise writer and publicist, are an early
example of the increasing importance of the separation of law and politics.
In 1854 and 1855 Bishop published a series of seven brief essays on legal
principles in the American Law Register.3 6 His main theme expressed the
danger of depending solely on authorities - decided cases - and
neglecting the principles of law, a danger especially acute in the United
States with its multiplication of common law jurisdictions.3 According to
Bishop, law was made up both of the rules of "natural justice" and of
"technical rules" through which natural justice is administered.3 8 The true
task of the lawyer is to understand the principles of law. That understanding does not come solely, or even primarily, from the study of cases. The
ultimate test of a legal principle is whether it comports with "that natural
sense of right and justice which the Maker of us all has placed in the human
mind."139 Judges do not by virtue of their office acquire any special skill in
ascertaining legal principles. "We should remember," Bishop wrote, "that
a judge has no better opportunity to know what is a legal principle, than the
humblest man in the ranks of the profession."' 0 The ability to know what a
principle is "depends upon the person's natural capabilities and his
experience, study and reflection.""' In addition, judges are preoccupied,
and rightly so, with deciding the case before them. They are concerned with
results first and with reasoning to those results second. Their statements of
principles, therefore, are often incorrect."2 In sum, we arrive at the
34. Id. at 10.

35. Id. at 11-12.
.36. Joel P. Bishop, Law in the United States, 3 AM. L. REG. 60 (1854); Legal
Principles.No. 11, 3 AM. L. REG. 185 (1855); Legal Principles.No. 11, 3 AM. L. REG. 252
(1855); Legal Principles.No. IV, 3 AM. L. REG. 312 (1855); Legal Principles.No. V, 3 AM.
L. REG.381 (1855); Legal Principles.No. VI, 3 AM. L. REG. 505 (1855); Legal Principles.
No. VII, 3 AM. L. REG. 633 (1855).
37. Joel P. Bishop, Law in the United States, 3 AM. L. REG. 60-61 (1854).
38. Joel P. Bishop, Legal Principles. No. H, 3 AM. L. REG. 185 (1855).
39. Joel P. Bishop, Legal Principles. No. II, 3 AM.L. REG. 252 (1855).
40. Joel P. Bishop, Legal Principles. No. V, 3 AM. L. REG. 383 (1855).
41. Id.
42. Joel P. Bishop, Legal Principles. No. IV, 3 AM. L. REG. 314 (1855).
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knowledge of legal principles by reasoning to elementary truths. We test
our reasoning by tracing out the consequences of the principle.
Are those consequences such as the adjudications of the courts show us to
have an actual existence in the law? If we see, on the comparison, that our
supposed principle, traced in every direction, leads to consequences
precisely in accordance with the facts of the law as exemplified in the
decisions of the Courts, we conclude that it is true and sound; in other
words, that it is a legal principle. In so comparing our deductions with the
decisions, we do not inquire, as being material, whether or not the judges, in
arriving at the decisions, have recognized our principle. If they have, we
may still find that it is erroneous; if they have not, we may yet find that it is
correct."'
For Bishop, the judges'job did not even include the systematic statement of
the law, let alone the making of it. He stated that "the full force of their
minds is directed to arriving at right results.""" Principles were the
province of thinkers like himself, who dedicated themselves to legal
understanding and recording that understanding in treatises."5
By the late 1860s, Bishop's emphasis on the existence of principles, not
cases, had become even more pronounced, perhaps in reaction to the
publication of Austin's lectures. In The First Book of the Law, Bishop set
forth what he believed every student should know about the nature of law."6
Compared to the 1850's, he more clearly emphasized the separation
between cases and the principles of law. "[T]he law is a system of
principles," he reiterated, "and the principles are the law itself, while the
cases are only to be received in the nature of evidence, tending more or less
strongly to prove the principles."' 7 Moreover, the state could not change
8
legal principles any more than it could order a stream to run uphill.'
Twenty years later, Bishop still believed that judicial decisions were
only evidence of the law, representing conclusions on particular facts. 9
43. Joel P. Bishop, Legal Principles. No. VII, 3 AM. L. REG. 634 (1855).
44. Joel P. Bishop, Legal Principles. No. IV, 3 AM. L. REG. 314 (1855).
45. Id.
46. JOEL P. BISHOP, THE FIRST BOOK OF THE LAW: EXPLAINING THE NATURE,
SOURCES, BOOKS, AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF LEGAL SCIENCE, AND METHODS OF
STUDY AND PRACTICE (1868).

47. Id. at 83-84.
48. Id. at 49-50.
49. Joel P. Bishop, The Common Law as a System of Reasoning, - How and Why
Essential to Good Government; What Its Perils, and How Averted, 22 AM. L. REv. 1, 7
(1888) (the text of a speech Bishop gave before the South Carolina Bar Association in
Columbia, South Carolina, on December 12, 1887, which was also published in a pamphlet
entitled COMMON LAW AND CODIFICATION; OR THE COMMON-LAW AS A SYSTEM OF
REASONING).
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However, he emphasized even more strongly, the inability of legislation
alone to alter the law. His definition of law placed it above the day-to-day
fray. He told the South Carolina Bar Association, that "[t]hose visible
things we call law and government spring naturally out of the invisible
nature of man, under the influence of his surroundings.""0 A court's
decision of a new question, "differing from what has gone before," does not
require the consultation of the books but rather of "the law engraved, not
by man, but by God, on the nature of man." 51 Thus, law consists "of a
beautiful and harmonious something not palpable to the physical sight, yet
to the understanding obvious and plain, called principles. "52
The investigation of this law is a special skill known as legal reasoning.
The investigator must trace the established decisions to their principle
"and thence pass downward to the new facts and inquire whether or not
they are within the same principle. . . ."'I When this process is correctly
performed, the investigator "discovers, one by one, the laws which always
existed, though, it may be, never before understood, pertaining to the
government of men in communities.""" In fact, " [a] 11governmental affairs
• . .travel in the path of precedent."5 5 Thus, Government, like law, is
plagued by decisions made through mechanical application of rules
without consideration of the reasons for those rules." The survival of our
government, therefore, depends on the cultivation of legal reasoning and
the avoidance of legislation which substitutes fiat for an understanding of
the law.
Bishop's scorn of the legislature was typical of those who belittled
Austin's view of law as command, and instead found the source of law
beyond the day-to-day workings of the world. For example, the wild
machinations of the railroad wars in New York, as well as the instances of
municipal corruption associated with the Tweed Ring, helped to inspire
Nicoll's lament that everyone was at the "mercy of the unscrupulous
plunderers of the people" and "the surging tide of corruption which
threatens to overwhelm us.''57 Thomas Hoyne, a local Chicago lawyer, told
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27-29.
Nicoll, supra note 32, at 15. For a classic account of the railroad wars see CHARLES
FRANCIS ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE AND OTHER ESSAYS (1886). For a modern discussion
with reference to literature see MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD 7687 (1986). For a careful assessment of the Tweed scandals which goes far to rehabilitate the
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graduates of the old University of Chicago that "the current conversation
of society is the last job of the lobby or the 'ring,' which has carriedthrough
some legislature, under the forms of law, the appropriation to private uses
of the public property or taxes to the amount of millions." 8 The excesses of
Reconstruction legislatures provided the horrible examples for Edwards
Pierrepont, Langdell's sometime law partner, who similarly cautioned an
audience at Yale to deal carefully with the compilations of the Roman law
because they were assembled "after the last embers of civil and political
liberty were cold" and were designed to "expressly inculcate the foul
doctrine of absolute power in the Sovereign and that every right and all the
authority of the people were transferred to him." 9
Although these lamentations about the failings of legislatures are
somewhat ritualistic, they do nevertheless evidence opposition to the idea
that the ultimate source of law is the sovereign's command. Discussion of
these topics heightened after the controversy over codification was revived
by the passage of a civil code by the New York legislature. The New York
Constitution of 1846 mandated codification of both the procedural and
substantive law of the state.60 The Code of Civil Procedure was written and
adopted in short order, but the civil code remained unfinished for many
years.61 In 1879, the New York legislature finally passed a version of the
civil code only to have it vetoed by the governor." The code was revised,
and in 1882, it was again passed by both houses of the New York
legislature, only to be vetoed again by the governor. 3 These events, as well
as the adoption by other states of the New York codes of procedural and
substantive law, especially by new states in the west, sparked discussion
Tamanay leader's reputation see LEO HERSHKOWITZ, TWEED'S NEW YORK: ANOTHER
LOOK (1977).
58. Thomas Hoyne, Address to the Graduating Class of the Law School of the
University of Chicago 12-13 (June 30, 1869).
59. Edwards Pierrepont, Oration on the Influence of Lawyers Upon Free Governments 2 (1874).

60. Alison Reppy, The Field Codification Concept, in

DAVID

DUDLEY

FIELD:

17, 32 (Alison Reppy ed., 1949).
61. On the Code of Civil Procedure, usually called the Field Code after its principal
author, David Dudley Field, see LaPiana, supra note 24, at 287, 302-27. On the stillbirth of
the codes of substantive law, see DAUN VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW 46-56 (1986). See also Reppy, supra note 60, at 36-42;
MARTIN, supra note 31, at 146-50.
62. Philip J. Bergan, David Dudley Field: A Lawyer's Life, in THE FIELDS AND THE
LAW: ESSAYS 48 (1986).
63. VAN EE, supra note 61, at 331-32.
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emphasizing the transcendent nature of law and the imbecility of
legislatures.6 4
In 1879 the New York State Bar Association sponsored an essay
competition that asked "is the common law a proper subject for codification?"6 5 Not surprisingly, the first and second place essays both answered
the question with a resounding no. Both writers argued in terms much like
those Bishop used. William Ivins, the second place writer, declared that
"the only universal and unchangeable elements of law are those principles
fertile of consequences which do not descend into detail and which are not
subject-matter of codification - the general maxims which are the only
legis legum known to jurisprudence. "6 6 Shelton Viele, in the winning
essay, defined the common law as "the great body of principles and
precedent now existing and recognized in the law exclusive of purely
statutory enactments and restrictions."6 7 According to Viele, scientific
codification required the discovery and statement of the fundamental
principles of the law which are universally true."
These positions became official views of the organized New York bar
as its fight against the civil code continued into the early 1880s. The
Association of the Bar of the City of New York entered the fray with its
own official observation that the proposed civil code's declaration of the
sources of law was completely misguided.6 9 According to the code, the
"will of the sovereign" is expressed by the Constitution, statutes, and "the
judgments of the tribunals enforcing those rules which, though not
enacted, from what is known as customary or common law." 7 0 To the
contrary, the common law claims its origins not from the will of the
64. The Civil Code was adopted in Georgia in 1863, California in 1866, Montana and
North and South Dakota in 1872. MARTIN, supra note 31, at 154.
65. 3 N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N REP. 91 (1879).
66. William M. Ivins, Is the Common Law a ProperSubjectfor Codification?, N.Y.
ST. B. Ass'N REP. 195 (1879). He clearly spoke the language of historical jurisprudence in a
way which revealed the links between law and other aspects of social thought:
For law is not something superimposed upon society, but, like the language, morals,
religion and politics of a people, it springs from their common consciousness. The
formulations of positive law are to be sought in the national spirit, that volkgeist, as
the Germans call it, which exists in all the members of a nation, and has its life in the
national history, producing specific traits of nationality, as distinguished from the
generic traits of humanity.
Id. at 195.
67. Shelton T. Viele, Is the Common Law a ProperSubjectfor Codification?, 3 N.Y.
ST. B. ASS'N. REP. 171 (1879).
68. Id. at 172-73.
69. On the role of the Association see MARTIN, supra note 31, at 147-57.
70. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE AMENDMENT OF THE LAW UPON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE 7 (1881).
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sovereign but "from the customs and habits of thought and action of a
brave and free people." ' 71 A committee of the Association, specially

appointed to urge the rejection of the code, made the separation of the
common law from politics explicit:
The common or unwritten law relates mainly to the principles and rules
governing the conduct and affairs of men in their private relations and
dealings. It is not made up of the arbitrary enactments of legislative bodies;
but is a system or body of doctrine developed from7 2 the application of
original principles to the actual experiences of life.
The committee asserted that legislative statement and enactment of these
principles could be of use only in very special circumstances. As another
unsympathetic critic of the proposed New York code observed:
Law in general, as civilized men recognize it, actually or potentially, exists
in or results from the harmony of the universe and the natural relations and
fitness of things. .

.

. It is not merely an arbitrary or positive rule of action,

created by a mortal sovereign's will. Neither is it something invented by
human intelligence. It may be discovered by us through Revelation, or
evolved by human wisdom though the results of observation and experience. When thus found, as its development approximates to perfection, it
may, to some extent, by slow degrees be safely formulated into written
language. 3
Although the Governor vetoed the New York code in 1882, discussion
of the topic of codification continued. Some of the commentary by lawyers
questioned the competence of the legislature to enact a code. One writer
asked whether better answers to legal questions could be expected from
"an independent and learned judiciary" or from "an ever shifting elective
body, wavering often between that devil, the lobbyist, and the deep sea of
popular clamor." 7 Another lawyer made the same point while exhibiting
some sympathy for the people's representatives. C.C. Bonney wrote:
If there be, as I readily confess there are, in some of the State legislatures,
and in Congress, individual lawyers who are eminently qualified for the
task [of codification], they are so burdened and vexed with multitudinous
political and administrative duties, with committee service, and with the
71. Id.
72. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report of the Special Committee
to Urge the Rejection of the Proposed Civil Code, October 10, 1882, at 21 (1882).
73. ALBERT MATTHEWS, THOUGHTS ON CODIFICATION OF THE COMMON
ed. 1882).
74. Robert L. Weatherbe, Codification, 20 AM. L. REV. 324 (1886).
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irritating applications of importunate constituents, that they can not,
under such circumstances, perform the true work of codification.7 5
The editors of the 1884 American Law Review commented:
Imagine such a body as the Legislature of Missouri (or even of New York),
amending a code of the common law. Look in upon them; listen to their
wrangles, and consider who they are. Why, half of them cannot write their
names without running out their tongues. How helpless such a body of men
is when it comes to dealing with such a subject as the codifying of the
common law.7
Belief in legal principles above and beyond the legislature's grasp was
commonplace by the time the ABA's Committee on Legal Education
questioned the reliance on the law found in cases. Some scholars, such as
Arnold Paul, have traced the 1890's fear that the legislature was a
potential instrument of socialism and anarchism to this criticism.7 7
Bishop's treatment of government as a branch of legal reasoning is clearly
related to such fears, especially when one considers his 1888 observation
that anarchists seldom come from common law countries.78 One of the few
specific objections of Association of the Bar's special committee involved
proposed section 998, which prohibited leasing one room to more than one
family and enforced the prohibition by absolving tenants in such buildings
from the obligation to pay rent. In objecting to the provision, the committee
asserted that the legislature's abridgement of the freedom of contract also
infringed on the rights of the poor:
What proper connection is there between the "horrors" of the tenement
house and the despotic prohibition against an economy of rent, fuel, and
other living expenses, practicable for two poor sewing women, with perhaps
a child apiece, by hiring each a part of a single room?. . .[The section is an
example] of the disposition to dictate to men what they may or may not do,
and to trespass upon the most
essentially valuable of all civil rights, the
79
right to liberty of action.
Thus, the committee opposed such social legislation. These expressions of fear and frustration at the possibility of social legislation are not,
75. C.C. Bonney, Codification, 20 AM. L. REV. 26 (1886). Bonney was president of
the Illinois State Bar Association in 1883, see his annual address Law Reform and the
Future of the Legal Profession (1883).
76. Codification of the Common Law, 18 AM. L. REV. 99-100 (1884).
77. ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF
BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895, at 61-81, 159-84 (1969).
78. Bishop, supra note 49, at 48.
79. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO URGE THE REJECTION OF THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE 20 (1881).
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however, the only motif found in the legal rhetoric of the period. The
commentators also opposed the Austinian definition of law. George H.
Smith, a California attorney and legal writer of the time, had no use for
Austin or for any theory of law which placed its principles within the reach
of the legislature. 8 According to Smith, ever since Blackstone's definition
of law as the order of a political superior, "the still more foolish theory
developed out [of the Blackstone definition] by Bentham and Austin, and
the general reception of the Bentham/Austin theory . . ., English and
American lawyers have, with few exceptions, lost all conception of what the
law is." 8 Smith argued that what Anglo-American lawyers have forgotten
is that part of law which the Romans called the jus gentium. The jus
gentium contains unchanging principles which are the basis of law. By
contrast, the jus civile, which is the law of particular states, varies from
nation to nation and is expressed, at least in England and America, in
decided cases. 82 The separation of the two can only be understood by a
thorough study of the Roman jurists who first developed the distinction
between the ephemeral and the permanent in law. 8" The permanent part of
the law embodied in principles is the true subject of legal science. The rules
of law established by the will of legislator are applicable only "to cases
coming within their explicit terms." Principles of the law, however, "are
principles in the true sense and are true not only in their explicit statement,
but in all their implied logical consequences." 8 For Smith and Bishop,
therefore, legal reasoning involved the application of principles to new
situations through logical deduction. Smith's notion of legal science was
not inductive. Smith believed that the notion that law is the cases and can
be taught from cases is mistaken because law is reason and its source is
reason. He asserted that the idea of legal science behind the case method of
instruction promulgated by the Harvard faculty was therefore gravely
flawed.
According to this notion, the law is supposed to be an inductive science, and
the decisions of the courts to be the natural phenomena upon which it rests;
80. Smith has been almost totally ignored by scholars; the only exception is JAMES E.
1870-1970: A HISTORY 46-49 (1990).
81. George H. Smith, Of the Certainty of the Law and the
Uncertainty of Judicial Decisions, 23 AM. L. REV. 702 (1889).
82. Smith, supra note 81, at 708-14; George H. Smith, The New Departurein English
Jurisprudence,28 AM. L. REV. 872 (1894). John Chipman Gray characterized Smith's
ideas as an "exploded superstition." JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF
THE LAW 309 (2nd ed. 1921).
83. George H. Smith, The True Method of Legal Education, 24 AM. L. REV. 216-26
(1890).
84. Smith, supra note 81, at 708.
HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE,
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and hence the system is likened by Professor Gray to the method of learning
chemistry by retort and crucible. But this is too novel an idea of science which has been hitherto supposed to rest upon the truths of nature, - to be
seriously entertained; and, until old notions are rectified it must appear
even ludicrous, to conceive of a science based upon so unstable a foundation
as the opinions of men, necessarily fluctuating, inconsistent, and selfcontradictory.88
In the end, the principles of the law were truths of nature and the idea that
they were the product of the sovereign's commands simply impossible. Not
surprisingly, the ultimate principle of justice as identified by Smith is
perfectly compatible with a laissez-faire approach to government:
The principles of justice, of which the former [the jus gentium as opposed
to jus civile] is composed, are in no way uncertain; for where all other
principles fail, there is always the principle "melior est conditiopossidetis,
et rei quam actoris," - a principle founded upon that of personal liberty or
self-ownership; which is the fundamental principle of jurisprudence. For it
is obvious that no one has the right to interfere with another except by
virtue of some clearly defined right; and the presumption being in favor of
liberty, the burden of showing an alleged right must rest on him who asserts
it; and hence where there is uncertainty the claim must fall to the ground.
Hence in practice there is seldom, if ever, any difficulty in perceiving the
justice of a case. 86
Smith provided perhaps the most complete exposition of the argument
asserting the existence of unchanging principles of law. Such arguments
supported a laissez-faire approach to matters of economic regulation and
social legislation. Smith himself, however, was not a doctrinaire supporter
of laissez-faire. In 1895, as the debt of the transcontinental railroads to the
federal government was coming due, he advocated foreclosure and
government operation of the roads as preferable to continued management
by rapacious directors. In his view such a course was the only way to protect
the "liberties and rights of individuals." Government management would
no doubt be less efficient than private ownership, "but the obvious
consideration presents itself, that whatever is saved on expenses by the
superior efficiency of private management, goes to the benefit of the
managers, and that the amount is insignificant compared with the other
amounts that are wrested from the public by private greed."8 In this
85. Smith, supra note 83, at 215.
86. Smith, supra note 81, at 709-10.
87. George H. Smith, The Pacific RailroadCompanies and the People of the TransMississippi States, 29 AM. L. REV. 206 (1895).
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instance, at least, Smith believed unchanging rights belonged to individuals, not corporations.
Smith's attitude towards nationalization of the railroads is an
example of the individualistic side of conservative legal thought, the
descendant of Jacksonian opposition to privilege. His intellectual premises,
along with those of the other writers who shared his belief in absolutes, are
also descended from antebellum ancestors. Law for these thinkers was still
the product of the mind of God, discoverable through investigation but not
made by the facts, that is, the cases. The Austinian theory of law,
separating law from morality and placing the source of law in political
power, challenged the older notions and led to clearer and more strident
assertion of the transcendent nature of law. It remained, however,
assertion. Neither Bishop nor Smith nor any of the writers considered gave
reasons for their belief, beyond the statement that Roman law embodied
universal truths.
Other thinkers, such as Maine, however, argued that they could prove
the transcendent nature of law in ways compatible with modern scientific
inquiry. They devoted themselves to refuting Austin's analytical jurisprudence through historical jurisprudence.In spite of the scientific thrust of
Maine's work, those American lawyers, discussed in the next part, who
appealed to history in general and often to Maine in particular to disprove
the Austinian theory of law proclaimed that history showed law to be
transcendent, with a permanence that political institutions could not alter.
To the naked assertions of the existence of transcendent, permanent law,
these scholars added historical proof.
III.

SCIENTIFIC LAW

Maine's Ancient Law was widely regarded as the epitome of historical
jurisprudence and many American thinkers relied on this jurisprudence to
disprove the analytical positivism they associated with Austin. 88 Their use
of Maine may or may not have been true to the spirit of the work they so
happily appropriated, but it is clear that they did accurately identify at
least one major theme found in Ancient Law: the use of science to examine
law - a science based principally on a comparative method. Maine
examined non-English societies to elucidate laws of development which
were true for Indo-European peoples.8 9 For example, he believed that
the proposition that a historical era of aristocracies succeeded a historical
88. Herget, supra note 80, at 25-29.

89. R.C.J.
38 (1988).
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era of heroic kings may be considered as true, if not of all mankind, at all
events of all branches of the Indo-European family of nations the important
point for the jurist, [then, is that] these aristocracies were universally the
depositaries and administrators of law.
This in turn gives rise to an era of customary law which all societies
seemingly experience during the course of their history. 90
Maine's interest in tracing the development of societies led to perhaps
the most frequently quoted passage from his work. Chapter V, Primitive
Society and Ancient Law, traces the major aspects of the law of persons to
the power of the father over the family. He dismisses all the speculation of
the philosophers about the state of nature with the assertion that "the
difficulty. . . is to know where to stop, to say of what races of men it is not
allowable to lay down that the society in which they are united was
originally organized on the patriarchal model." 91 History then shows the
''gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of individual
obligation in its place." 9 Thus it can be said "that the movement of the
progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to
Contract."93 Whatever Maine meant by this famous assertion, some
American thinkers seized on it as a justification for exalting custom above
positive law and for claiming that custom supported the notions of laissezfaire.
The remainder of this section examines the thoughts of seven
American legal writers: William G. Hammond,9 4 Thomas McIntyre

90. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 11 (1963).
91. Id. at 119.
92. Id. at 163.
93. Id. at 165.
94. Hammond was head of the law department at the State University of Iowa from
1868 to 1881 at which time he became dean of the St. Louis Law School (Washington
University). In addition to his editions of Francis Lieber's Legal Hermeneutics and
Blackstone's Commentaries, discussed below, in cooperation with Dillon he prepared for
several years digests of the Iowa decisions and from 1870-1873 served on the commission
which prepared a new code for the state. A graduate of Amherst, he studied jurisprudence
and civil law in Germany in the 1860's. Charles Claflin Allen, The St. Louis Law School, 1
GREEN BAG 289 (1889); Recent Deaths, 6 GREEN BAG 252 (1894).
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Cooley,9 5 Philemon Bliss,9 Christopher G. Tiedeman,97 Edward J.
Phelps,9 8 John F. Dillon, 99 and James C. Carter. 100
95. Second only to Story in combining the careers of judge, teacher, and author,
Cooley occupied both a professorship at the law school of the University of Michigan and a
seat on the Michigan Supreme Court for many years. He authored several important works
including treatises on constitutional law, torts and taxation, and an edition of Blackstone.
Toward the end of his life he served as the first chairman of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. ALAN R. JONES, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM OF THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY (1987).
96. Philemon Bliss was part of the New England diaspora, as was Cooley. Educated at
Oneida Institute and Hamilton College, he read law and eventually practiced in Ohio where
he served as a judge. He was elected to congress as a Republican in 1854 and 1856. He was
appointed chief justice of the Dakota territory in 1861, but resigned from that position in
1863 and moved to Missouri in 1864. He was again elected to the lower court bench and then
to the Missouri Supreme Court in 1868. After four years on the high court he retired and
was appointed to a professorship in the State University. He founded Missouri's law school
in 1873 and was its head until his death in 1889. In addition to his book on sovereignty
examined here, he authored a standard treatise on code pleading. L.C. Krauthoff, The
Supreme Court of Missouri, 3 GREEN BAG 183-84 (1891).
97. Christopher Tiedeman was Bliss's colleague at Missouri from 1881 to 1891. Like
Hammond he had studied in Germany. He received his LL.B. from Columbia in 1878, and
practiced for a time both in his native Charleston, South Carolina and in St. Louis before
accepting his academic appointment. In 1891 he took a position in the law school of the
University of the City of New York (the predecessor of New York University). In 1897, he
resigned to devote full time to writing. He returned to academic life in 1902 as dean of the
law school at the University of Buffalo and died the following year. His writings included
several treatises which became standard works. JACOBS, supra note 8, at 59.
98. Edward J. Phelps was a native of Vermont and a successful lawyer there for most
of his life. He took an early interest in politics, served in the Fillmore administration and
ended his public career as minister to England, a post to which he was appointed by
President Cleveland in 1885. He was one of the founders of the American Bar Association
and one of its first presidents. In 1881 he accepted the Kent Professorship at Yale and he
taught there, with the exception of his tenure in London, until his death in 1900. He
remained in practice during his teaching career and was of counsel to a New York City firm.
John W. Stewart, Memoir of HonorableEdward J. Phelps, in ORATIONS AND ESSAYS OF
EDWARD JOHN PHELPS, DIPLOMAT AND STATESMAN vii-xv (J.G. McCullough ed. 1901)
[hereinafter ORATIONS AND ESSAYS]. In his career he maintained a middle position between
the full time teachers and the academically inclined practitioners.
99. John F. Dillon served with distinction as both a state and federal judge, but
eventually left the bench for an equally successful career in private practice. In 1838 he
moved from his ancestral home in upstate New York to Iowa. He trained as a medical
doctor at the state university but left the practice of medicine due to his own frail health. He
turned to law which he felt would make fewer physical demands. Rising quickly through the
profession, he became a justice of the Supreme Court of Iowa in 1862. In 1869, President
Grant appointed him to the Eighth Circuit where he sat for ten years. In 1879 he left the
bench to teach at Columbia University while acting as solicitor for Union Pacific. Within
three years he left Columbia to devote himself entirely to private practice. "For many years
he argued more cases before the Supreme Court of the United States than any other
attorney, and until his death in 1914 was regarded as the leading railroad lawyer in the
country." The information in this paragraph is drawn from C. JACOBS, supranote 8, at 111 12. In the 1891-92 academic year he held the Storrs Professorship at Yale Law School,
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It is useful to begin with Hammond's 1880 edition of Francis Lieber's
Legal and PoliticalHermeneutics which was first published in 1839.101
Lieber's work contained several elements that would be developed further
in the post-Civil War period. First, he wedded the typical antebellum belief
in law appropriate for certain kinds of societies with a recognition of the
relationship between social change and change in law. Lieber believed it
was worthwhile to study the codes of nations "who acknowledge the same
fundamental view of civilization as ourselves." ' 0 2 The law exemplified by
this comparative study is not unchanging. The supreme law is public
welfare and "those states are doomed to decline, and fall to ruin, which
endeavor to rule by ancient laws and forms only, and obstinately resist the
progress and spirit of the age, as if the public mind could be encircled or
checked by oral or written sentences." 10 3 Lieber defined nations by "the
10
shared experiences of a group of people.9 '
Hammond expanded upon these views in the lengthy collection of
notes he appended to the third edition of the treatise. First he emphasized
the historical uniqueness of each nation's character and the uselessness of
forms based the obsolete experience of others. Hammond understood the
progress and spirit of the age which Lieber saw as shaping a nation's law
through the action of the public mind through history. Thus the extolling of
the English constitution as a model for all states ignores "the difference
made by historical circumstances." 10 5 This error "brings with it ethical
injury to the indigenous constitution of the people which is the subject of
where he delivered the lectures published as The Laws andJurisprudenceof Englandand
America. JOHN FORREST DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND
AMERICA (1894).
100. James Coolidge Carter was a graduate of Harvard Law School and a devoted and
active alumnus. 14 Dictionary of American Biography 536 (D. Amlone, ed. 1934).
Although his career began slowly, he eventually became an enormously successful
practitioner of the new style of corporate practice. His interest in jurisprudence began with
an appointment to the committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
which opposed the proposed civil code for the State of New York. To refute the claims for
the code so energetically made by its author, David Dudley Field, Carter delved "into
inquiries concerning the distinctions between written and unwritten law." CARTER, supra
note 21. He turned his researches into several important speeches and finally, toward the
end of his life, he drew them all together into the lectures on the subject prepared for
presentation at Harvard Law School but never delivered. The lectures were published
posthumously as Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function.
101. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (1839).
102. Id. at 161. On Lieber, see generally FRANK FREIDEL, FRANCIS LIEBER:
NINETEENTH-CENTURY LIBERAL (1947).
103. Id. at 183.
104.

PHILLIP S.

PALUDAN,

A COVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CONSTITUTION, LAW,

71 (1975).
105. William G. Hammond, Note D. On the Term 'Sovereignty,' in

AND EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA
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the mistake, interferes with the sound development of the native law, and
prevents that law from being clearly understood by the people." 1 6 This
native law is the legitimate law of a nation. An example in the AngloAmerican world is the insistence that crimes be carefully defined by the
positive law of the state. This belief "is the logical continuation of the same
feeling which overthrew the Star-Chamber, and made its very name, as a
court of criminal equity, synonymous with iniquity and oppression."'0 7 Out
of historical experience comes the common law which is made not by
legislative enactment, but by that very historical experience. 0 8 It is not
surprising that Hammond maintained that the existence of an unwritten
constitution "in England and America long before the first reduction of the
constitution of any state to writing is too familiar a matter of history to be
proved here."' 1 9 In fact, the unwritten constitution controls the legislative
power.
All the recent cases which state, as a ground for holding law unconstitutional, the fact that the legislature have assumed power not truly legislative
in its character prove the same thing [the existence of the unwritten
constitution]; for certainly it is to the unwritten constitution, not to the
written one, that we must go to learn what power is legislative." 0
In 1890 Hammond, then Dean of St. Louis Law School, further
explained his views in his edition of Blackstone's Commentaries."' In
notes throughout the text of this scholarly edition, Hammond collated all of
the changes made in the eight editions of the Commentaries published
during Blackstone's lifetime. He also appended "copious notes" to the
text especially to discuss these changes as presented, not only in the rulings of
our courts, but also in the works of a considerable number of acute thinkers
who have commented largely, and by no means sparingly, upon Blackstone,
and who, if they differ widely among themselves, at least consent in
presenting a different theory of the law from any known in the eighteenth
century."'
note 101, at 277-78. Hammond's notes follow Lieber's text and are numbered consecutively
with it.
106. Id.
107. William G. Hammond, Note J. On the Interpretation of Criminal Law, in
LIEBER, supra note 101, at 293-94.
108. Hammond, supra note 16, at 51.
109. William G. Hammond, Note M. On Written and Unwritten Constitutions,in
LIEBER, supra note 101, at 309.
110. Id. at 309-10.
111. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1890).
112. William G. Hammond, in BLACKSTONE, supra note 111, at xviii (preface).
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Those thinkers who have promoted the "historical theory of law" have
made a change which is "fundamental, and must be understood by any one
who would know the common law as it is now administered in America, to
say nothing of its past development." The "so-called school of analytic
jurists," however, have been quite mistaken and have promulgated a view
of law "farther away from the true sense of law, as we now understand it,
than Blackstone's own view." ' 13
According to Hammond, the proper view was one that saw law as
order rather than command. Law does not tell a person what to do but
rather allows one to regulate "one's own conduct through the power of
foreseeing the results of one's actions." Thus, law is to be understood "not
as commands to do or not to do, but as rules of established order." '14 The
source of the established order is custom, proven by the history of the
development of law, which is more or less the same, at least "among the
Aryan races." Initially, law and custom are identical. Gradually men
realize that with the consent of others certain customs can be varied
without invoking supernatural vengeance. Eventually the advantages of
variance are understood, and the idea that rules can be made by consent
gradually appears.1 1 5 Legislation, however, is forever based on the customs
which originally were the only source of law. The changes made by
legislation must never trespass on vested rights, and indeed, "the extent of
such changes in an ordinary lifetime is very small. It has only been
exaggerated by false theories which confound law with legislation. "6
This correct understanding of the nature of law is clearly the product
of the new historical way of studying law. In particular, the progression to
the stage of legislation is closely related to Maine's description of the
succession of methods of legal change. Hammond also made reference to
the progression from status to contract in a way which clearly indicated his
acceptance of its implied approval of laissez-faire economics.
Consider, for example, the immense addition to human powers produced
by the general diffusion of the law of contracts, hardly known even in its
rudiments to our early ancestors. It enables the merchant to extend his
business over the whole navigable globe, and to reckon with confidence the
result of transactions which may extend through years. It multiplies the
power of the capitalist as many times as the number of persons whom he
can induce by wages, or some other form of profitable contract, to labor in
his interest and carry out his plans. These great results are not so much the
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
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Id. at 103-104.
Id. at 102.
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consequence of the rule of ethics, which bids every man keep his word, as of
the rules of law, which give each contracting party power to enforce upon
11 7
others the obligations they have assumed.
However, Hammond did not share Maine's critical attitude towards
comprehensive theories, like the idea of the social contract, which were
based on speculation rather than historical evidence. Hammond believed
in inviolable principles, such as the existence of vested rights which simply
exist without reference to any explanation except that they inhere in the
nature of things. In fact, the common law itself reflects the existence of "a
Divine order in the moral as well as physical constitution of the world."1 1
It is not surprising, then, that Hammond should belittle legislation and the
Austinian theory which makes it the source of all law.
As part of his argument, he even created a remarkable reconciliation
of Blackstone's well-known statement of the supremacy of Parliament with
the practice of judicial review in the United States. American courts,
unlike English theorists of judicial control of Parliament, "have distinctly
repudiated any right to pass upon thejustice or reasonableness of such acts,
or to declare them void as contrary to natural law." 1 9 They proceed on the
legitimate ground that they must "obey the letter of the constitution in
preference to that of any merely legislative authority."'' 0 This belief in fact
vindicates the rule of the people.
It is the distinct recognition of two grades of law, of which that enacted by
the people in their constitution overrules that framed by the delegated
power of the legislature, upon which the action of these courts rests and not
upon any right of the courts themselves to overrule or in any manner revise
the conclusions of another department of government. 121
Cooley held similar views. His view of the American past led him to a
perspective on American law much like Hammond's; Cooley highly
regarded Lieber and his ideas of the organic nature of the state. The
essence of Anglo-American history was the development of individual
2
freedom and the limitation of legislative attempts to infringe it.1
Nurtured in the Jacksonian reaction to the influence of special interests on
the state legislatures, especially concerning the financing of railroads,
Cooley placed certain fundamental propositions above the legislative and
117. Id.
118. William G. Hammond, On Precedent and the DoctrineofAuthority in the Law,
in LIEBER, supra note 101, at 328 (note n).
119. William G. Hammond, in BLACKSTONE supra note 111, at 240-41 (note 35).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Jones, supra note 95, at 104-07.
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political fray. 12 3 Law is basically customary and grows out of the lives of
the American people. Law is truly popularly made and expresses the best of
the people and is therefore just. 2 4 The legislature cannot derange it.
Law is something more than a collection of rules. Those who expect to find
somewhere all the law in black and white, fail to grasp its divine
significance. .... Law is expressed in statutes and in decisions, but as the
anatomy is not all of the man, so these are not all of the law; there is a vital
force which is more than the words, and which, if the word were all blotted
out, would still hold the units of society together and in order, while the
words were being reproduced. And this vital force is inspired and
invigorated by kinship to an Intelligence that is higher than the State, and
above all human arrangements. 2 5
Cooley's historical conservatism does not appear to be related to ideas
26
of Maine. If Cooley had a mentor in historical thought, it was Burke.1
Cooley's thought was so completely grounded in historical experience that
he explicitly agreed with Austin that all rights are the creatures of law and
do not depend on reasoning from a state of nature and an original social
contract. 2 7 Apparently, Cooley did not even attempt to appeal to the
science of legal history promulgated by Maine. His thought related back to
the traditional view of the common law as the embodiment of English
liberty. 2 8 Cooley believed, without a doubt, that certain legal principles
are both unchanging and rooted in something far greater than human
opinion.
The link between the experience of the people and the expression of
the divine is even more pronounced in Bliss's Of Sovereignty, published in
1885. Bliss attempted to elucidate the nature of the American state and to
accurately describe the division of power and authority between the state
and federal governments. Austin's definition of law as the sovereign's
command was difficult to apply to a federal state where the existence of a
single sovereign was problematic at best. Austin, himself, had "difficulty
applying his theory to the United States. 12 9 Bliss's contribution to the
123. Id. at 72-89, 131, 157-65.
124. Thomas M. Cooley, The Uncertaintyof the Law, 22 AM. L. REV. 347, 365-366

(1888).
125. Id. at 367.
126. Jones, supra note 95, at 231-46.
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§ 4, at 7 n.8. (D. Avery Haggard ed., 4th ed.

1932).
128. Jones, supra note 95, at 235 n.79, 106-09.
129. AUSTIN, supra note 11, at 257-67. For a brief discussion of the difficulties in
applying Austin's ideas to the United States, see Gray, supra note 82, at 74-79. A fuller
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debate is both interesting and original, However, for present purposes, the
important part of his work is the first sixty (approximately) pages which
lay the groundwork for the analysis of sovereignty on an uncompromising
attack on Austin's theory of law. 130
One sentence summarizes Bliss's theme: "The truth of legal history is
. . .that the common law of every country, the great body of the law, if
generally obeyed, is founded upon usage, upon the moral reason, upon
common consent, and not upon command." 131 Not surprisingly, Bliss
believed that the United States had an unwritten constitution.
The great body of the constitution, the real force, - that which guards
rights, tempers the exercise of powers, makes duties imperative and
responsibilities real, interprets to officials the how and the what, after
anarchy brings order out of chaos, -exists in the habits, the notions, the
social vitality of a people. The written constitution is a help; but one whose
letter is not supported by the unwritten is but chaff."3 2
This assertion can be proven by investigating the "rudest societies" where
there is recognition of "the primary precepts of the law of contracts"
without the benefit of anyone's command. 33 Although the law is not fully
developed in such rude societies, that does not mean that unenacted,
natural law does not exist. The natural law is that law which is most
developed. Therefore, in more advanced the societies, the precepts of
natural law be more clearly evident.' As society develops, people will
advance in understanding and perfection and, through "common consent,"
enforce an ever more perfect law. 1 35 Finally, Bliss did not hesitate to
identify the law and the state with the Godhead:
Society itself springing from Nature, that is from God; the higher reason,
discussion of American attempts to deal with Austin's definition of sovereignty as applied to
the United States can be found in PETER J. KING, UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE IN
AMERICA: THE INFLUENCE OF BENTHAM AND AUSTIN ON AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 337-484 (1986). For information concerning legal thinkers'

responses to the Civil War, see generally PALUDAN, supra note 104.
130. Gray agreed with Bliss's discussion of American sovereignty but with little else in
the book. "Unfortunately, the unsatisfactory character of the discussion on the nature of
Law, with which the Essay [Bliss's work] opens, repels students from reading further."
GRAY, supra note 82, at 78 n. 1. Cooley also held a view of American sovereignty close to
that of Bliss. See Philemon Bliss, Sovereignty in the United States, 1 MICH. L.J., 81-92
(1892).
131. PHILEMON BLISS, OF SOVEREIGNTY 52 (1884).
132. Id. at 163. In support of this statement Bliss cites Hammond's "Note M" in his
edition of Lieber. Id. at n.1.
133. Id. at 26.
134. Id. at 37.
135. Id. at 37, 46-47, 52.
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as well as the animal and social instincts, being also from God, - the rules
which regulate our relations, as not only in harmony with every instinct, but
as designed to prevent the abuse of the subordinate, as suggested by the
higher in order to insure their subjection, all point to the great Source of
good. Is there anything in jural society, when it answers its ends, that does
not spring from the will of God? Who then are the legislators and
magistrates but servants, minister of justice, bound to obey His will: And
who but God is sovereign? The revolt against the superstitions which in all
States and with all religions have sought to substitute the say-so of priests
for that of God is no reason for rejecting the authority which is above all
priesthoods, all States.1"6
Bliss linked the idea that history reveals the operation of transcendent
law with the notion that the enforcement of that law in society depends on
the level of development of its people. Christopher G. Tiedeman further
developed these two ideas while omitting Bliss's teleological views. In 1885,
he reviewed Bliss's work for the American Law Review. According to
Tiedeman, Bliss established
that law is not the product of the arbitrary will of the legislator, but the
resultant of the natural forces that are, for the time being, at work in
organized society, and that the mere ipse dixit of the supreme power socalled, cannot create a living law, except so far as its enactment is
3
compelled by the resistless demands of society.1
Tiedeman then noted out that European jurists, especially von Ihering, had
reached a similar conclusion. 138 All law is the product of social forces;
fundamental principles of law resulting from those forces are universal.
Like Bliss, Tiedeman also concluded that there is no sovereign, but in the
place of Bliss's invocation of the Deity, Tiedeman substituted "the control
of social needs and necessities" which are beyond all mere human power.1 9
The influence of society upon the law became the theme of Tiedeman's
work. "No one can seriously question," he told the New York State Bar
Association in 1896, "that law, in its totality, is an expression of the
national will."1"" He went so far as to assert in The Unwritten Constitution
136. Id. at 63.
137. Christopher G. Tiedeman, Book Review, 19 AM. L. REV. 947-948 (1885)
(reviewing

PHILEMON BLISS, OF SOVEREIGNTY

(1884)).
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lectures at Goettingen.
139. Id. at 948.
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of the United States that the original intent of the framers of the
Constitution was meaningless.
Now the living power, whose will is given expression in the written word [of
the Constitution], is not the men who framed or voted for the written word,
but the present possessors of political power. The present popular will must
indicate which shade of meaning must be given to the written word. 41
Tiedeman carried his analysis to the extreme by asserting that there are no
universally accepted natural rights which are relevant to jurisprudence.
Rather, there are only "popular notions of rights" which "do become
incorporated into, and exert an influence upon, the development of the
1 42
actual law.
Given Tiedeman's emphasis on the importance of the actual needs and
desires of society in the creation of law, one might expect that he was an
early advocate of "sociological jurisprudence" like that developed by
Roscoe Pound from his consideration of the same continental jurists
studied by Tiedeman.14 3 However, the year after his review of Bliss
Tiedeman published his magnum opus, A Treatise on the Limitations of
Police Power in the United States, in which he expounded the theory that
the Constitution severely limited legislatures' abilities to regulate the use
of property."4 Although he does make a passing reference to natural rights
which belong to man "in a state of nature, '' 5 his principal point is that
society makes law, and what is important is the kind of law society makes.
Tiedeman states that "the unwritten law of this country is in the main
against the exercise of police power, and the restrictions and burdens,
imposed upon persons and private property by police regulations, are
jealously watched and scrutinized."'' 4 6
Five years later, Tiedeman clarified this theory when he wrote, in The
Unwritten Constitution, that the natural rights of the day, set by social
forces, must be and can be protected through the mechanism of judicial
review because natural rights are truly imbedded in the Constitution, and
social forces define the meaning of what the Constitution. The natural
Education. III., 1
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rights to be protected, however, are those of the doctrine of laissez-faire,
the right to do whatever one wishes so long as no damage reaches
another."" According to his writing in 1885, Tiedeman stated that these
rights were under serious attack. "Socialism, Communism, and Anarchism are rampant throughout the civilized world. The State is called on to
protect the weak against the shrewdness of the stronger, to determine what
wages a workman shall receive for his labor and how many hours daily he
shall labor.11 148 In this passage, Tiedeman hints that the legislature is the
source of the attack, a position he makes explicit a few pages later:
Contemplating these extraordinary demands of the great army of discontents, and their apparent power, with the growth and development of
universal suffrage, to enforce their views of civil polity upon the civilized
world, the conservative classes stand in constant fear of the advent of an
absolutism more tyrannical and more unreasoning than any before
experienced by man, the absolutism of a democratic majority.1" 9
For Tiedeman, the legislature was neither the source of law nor the
representative of the social forces that made the law. Presumably, the
course of our history shows what social forces really are, and Tiedeman,
like the other scholarly authors, accepts the idea that the tenets of liberal
1 50
economics pervade our history.
Phelps also believed in the primacy of principles which are an integral
part of Anglo-American history. According to Phelps, the lawyer should
not concern himself with cases but rather with "the foundation principles
which underlie all propositions of law." 1 51 These principles form part of
what Phelps called the law of the land which is unalterable by the
legislature. The principles are "inherent in the human conscience" and
"derive their authority from the spontaneous and universal recognition of
intelligent humanity as well as from divine revelation." '52 The rights which
are based on these principles - rights to life, liberty, and property - are
147.
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therefore "placed beyond the reach of any department of the
government."' 53
History confirms the primacy of these rights. In spite of the universal
nature of these rights and the principles upon which they rest, they are also,
in some way, the exclusive heritage of "the Anglo-Saxon race." These
rights are embodied in a unique way in "the common law of England, which
is likewise the common law of the English-speaking race everywhere."' 54
Additionally, the common law includes certain "legal rights" which are the
means of carrying out the enjoyment of the fundamental rights. These legal
rights are the growing part of the law that changes as society changes. 155
These legal rights cannot be made by any authority. They are valid and
enforceable only to the extent that they reflect the condition of society.
Phelps, along with Tiedeman, believed that society, in some sense, made
law. Phelps clearly set out the anti-positivistic implications of that belief:
And no man has ever yet obtained a clear idea of it [the foundation of law]
who attempted to deduce its sanction from the maze of metaphysical
speculation, or who failed to comprehend that law among a free people
must have something else to stand upon besides positive authority, and
must be inspired by a controlling and animating spirit, that has sway over
the reason and the conscience of men. The days of arbitrary power in state,
in church, or in rules have passed away, so far as we are concerned, to be
15 6
seen no more.
Phelps found in this analysis of the transcendent nature of law the
needed protection for the rights of property. While the rights to life and
liberty are not seriously threatened in any way, "in various parts of the
world at the present time, in many forms, under many theories, and upon
widely differing propositions, the right of property has been brought into
question, has given rise to violent discussion, and has become sometimes
the subject of serious disturbance."' 5 7 Even in the United States, people
exist who do not propose to regulate property, which is perfectly permissible within constitutional limits, but instead propose to confiscate it - "to
take from the rich for the benefit of the poor." Their favorite means to this
perverted end "is to bring to bear upon those whom prosperity has rendered
153. Edward J. Phelps, Law of the Land, in ORATIONS
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obnoxious the power of excessive and unequal taxation." '5 8 Phelps claimed
that all such attempts to confiscate property are unconstitutional and must
be struck down by the courts when the legislature errs in furthering them
by statute. In sum, transcendent law, justified by its conformity to absolute
morality and even revelation, operates as a bulwark against any attempt by
a legislative majority to redistribute wealth.
Dillon's arguments were more sophisticated. He claimed to find worth
in both the analytical and historical schools of jurisprudence. He praised
Austin for separating law from morality.' 5 9 However, he had no use for the
definition of law as command as there is much more to law than mere
legislation.16 ° Dillon believed that law was "derived, especially in modern
times, still more largely from the general sense of justice and right as
interpreted and ascertained by the judges than from 'custom' in the usual
sense of the word." 6 1 This "general sense of justice and right" is based on a
reading of the history of Anglo-American liberty. 62
Like the other thinkers, Dillon joined his historical outlook with the
defense of property and by implication laissez-faire. He was explicit about
the overt threat to property posed "by the advocates of the various heresies
that go under the general name of socialism or communism, who seek to
array the body of the community against individual right to exclusive
property. . . ." Furthermore, he identified a covert threat
not by the socialist, but at the instance of a supposed popular demand; in
which case the attack is directed against particular owners or particular
forms of ownership, and generally takes the insidious, more specious, and
dangerous shape of an attempt to deprive the owners - usually corporate
owners - of their property by unjust or discriminating legislation in the
exercise of the power of taxation, or of eminent domain, or of that elastic
power known as the police power, - such legislation resulting, and
intending to result, in "clipping" the property, or "regulating" the owner
out of its full and equal enjoyment and use.' 63
This danger of the tyranny by the majority was foreseen by the Founding
Fathers, who "were neither visionaries nor socialists," and who guarded
against it through constitutional provisions. " The Fourteenth Amendment perfected this protection and set "the seal of national condemnation
158.
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upon Proudhon's famous maxim that 'property is theft.' "16" In Dillon's
view, it was the job of the courts to prevent any inroads into property rights
by these horrid ideas.' 6
For Dillon, the common law and the Constitution embody the essence
of Anglo-American liberty, which has at its heart the protection of
property. The fullest exposition of this approach to law, however, was
produced by another practitioner, James C. Carter. The message of
Carter's work is simple: all law is custom and courts declare but do not
make the law. Custom is gradually established through sanctions. The first
sanctions are informal ones which include self-help. Later, with the growth
of "organized government," society enforces the decisions of acknowledged experts in what the customs are. The organized force of society is
applied only "in the case of those breaches or alleged breaches of custom
which endanger the peace of society." Eventually, "as civilisation advances, and population, industry, and wealth increase, the social organization expands and advances," and the job of ascertaining custom is lodged in
"regular judicial tribunals,. .. armed with the whole power of the State to
directly enforce their decisions." The proceedings of these courts are
recorded in permanent form and are regarded "as authoritative declarations of binding custom." They become precedents and when litigation
arises if "an apt precedent is found it is followed without further inquiry,
and the precedents themselves are by the private work of jurists arranged in
1 67
scientific form and go to make up the fabric of substantive law.
According to Carter, the State itself, occasionally enacts legislation
but only in a limited field dealing with the organization and procedure of
the courts - the mechanism of government and the classification as crimes
of "mischievous acts which [had] not as yet been publicly punished." This
legislation is not law because it is not designed to directly regulate the
conduct of men in their dealings with each other." Rather, it is designed to
simply carry out the business of the State which is, in reality, "a great
corporation having many things to do." Even when the state legislates in
relation to the conduct of its citizens, it affects conduct only indirectly, the
"chief object being to create efficient instrumentalities for enforcing and
aiding the fundamental law of custom.""6 8
For Carter, not only was the public law completely separate from
private law, it was hopelessly inferior to it. Public law "is made by a single
human person, or by a very few persons, and necessarily exhibits the
165. Id. at 213.
166. Id.
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imperfection and error which attaches to all such works." 1 ' The private
law, on the other hand, is unwritten and rooted in custom. He summarized
his researches in exactly those terms:
The final conclusion of the inquiry, what rule or rules in point of fact
governed human conduct, was that, so far as social conduct is concerned,
custom is not simply one of the sourcesof law from which selections may be
made and converted into law by the independent and arbitrary fiat of a
legislature or a court, but that law, with the narrow exception of legislation,
is custom, and, like custom, self-existing and irrepealable.71
In fact, Carter notes that this customary law "may justly be called Divine;
for, being identical with custom which is the form in which human nature
necessarily develops conduct, it can have no other author than that of
1
human nature itself.''
Carter's basis for this conclusion is mainly historical, based on a
"survey of human life in all ages and in all stages of social progress."
This survey has embraced primitive man, the savage member of a
wandering horde; man when he first adopts a fixed place of abode; man
when he first consciously organises a social state; man when he has first
acquired the art of writing and when he first employs that art in the
composition of laws; man as the subject of a conqueror imposing his
dominion over realms not his own; man as the member of a conquered
nation accepting submissively the rule of strangers; man in society where
there is no power to protect him save his own right arm; man during the long
period in which he seeks by the establishment of judicial tribunals to
supplant the violence of self-help; man down to the period when judicial
tribunals and legislatures have been established and perfected; man in the
1
present enlightened age. ....
Carter had no doubt that all nations and peoples have passed or will pass
through these stages. His actual examples arose primarily from the history
of England, especially the development of judicial tribunals - the history
he knew best. Carter stated, "social progress elsewhere has not, as I
1 73
suppose, in substance been different from that exhibited in England.
Even the details of these various stages are uniform across societies.
Carter's examination of the characteristics of the last stage of
development was based on an examination of the courts of the United
States and England "for the reason that we are best acquainted with them,
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

230.
173.
231.
119.
55.

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23:519

and because we may be sure that the condition of courts in other countries,
however varying from that of these, is not fundamentally different.' 74 The
defect with theories of law which find their essence in command is that they
ignore the truth "that society, like every other phenomenon in nature, was a
condition resulting form the operation of causes reaching back into periods
infinitely remote ... .
These various attempts to establish, on a historical basis, the primacy
of custom in order to refute Austin's theory of the law, do differ in their use
of historical argument. Cooley, Phelps, and Dillon place more emphasis on
a peculiarly American or Anglo-American experience of history.
Tiedeman generalizes this point of view and finds in the history of all
nations the operation of social forces that create law. His appeal to
continental learning, however, seems to indicate an belief in the uniformity
of experience in the Western world. Hammond sees the history of the
Anglo-American world as revealing a pattern of order which is the source
of law, reflecting in turn the Divine moral order. Finally, Bliss explicitly
sees the hand of the Divine in the development of the law of all societies,
and Carter gives the most explicit exposition of that view. All these
theorists, appeal to history in order to show that law is not a command, the
product of will, but rather law is the expression of something greater than
individuals - the collective experience of human life. This experience,
especially in Carter's version of story, is to a great degree uniform and
progressive - a development to an ordained end.
This approach to refuting Austin was also used by E.C. Clark, Regis
Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge, whose own work criticizing Austin
was favorably cited by Bliss.' 76 Clark admired Austin's logical analysis of
"the actually existing legal ideas and conceptions," which was a welcome
corrective to "a previous philosophical school, whose members were
represented as cutting themselves adrift from experience and preferring
the evolution of a system out of principles dependent merely on their own
consciousness.' 77 Austin's definition of law as command, however,
"dwells so prominently upon the circumstances of legislation(orposition),
as to throw entirely into the shade those historical beginnings of law, which
have obviously existed in all nations, as rules of human conduct, anterior to
174. Id. at 66-67.
175. Id. at 268.
176. EDWIN CHARLES CLARK, PRACTICAL JURISPRUDENCE: A COMMENT ON AUSTIN
(1883).
177. CLARK, supra note 176, at 3-4. For similar praise of Austin for his freedom from
apriorispeculation, see Edwin Charles Clark, Jurisprudence:Its Use and Its Placein Legal
Education, I L.Q. REV. 201, 204-05 (1885).
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anything that can be reasonably spoken of or thought of as legislation at
all." 178
Clark maintained that an examination of the history of Greece, Rome,
and the Teutonic tribes reveals a more or less "unconscious definition" of
law. "The nearest approximation to a uniform or pervading idea is
certainly not so much that of enactment, position, and command, as of
antiquity, general approval and usage: where an original notion of
ordinancedoes appear, it is not human but divine." 179 Although in modern
times law is increasingly formulated by political authority, that is not the
only way to make law. History shows us that law can and has existed apart
from organized states,just as it shows us that there is a more or less uniform
definition of law. 80
Clark does not go as far as Austin's American critics in placing law
above the political fray. He agrees with Austin that judges do legislate, but
he sees in the judicial process a method of making law that is better than
legislation.
[T]he modifications effected by judiciary legislation are, at least, with us,
very little suggested or affected by political feeling. With rare exceptions,
they are based on purely scientific or utilitarian grounds, and are the result
of independent and individual reasoning. Such a process is uncommon in
political assemblies, where the most indifferent questions become matters
of party spirit, and the decision of each person
is generally determined
181
beforehand by the side to which he belongs.
As with the other theorists, Clark's opposition to Austin's ideas accompanies the denigration of the capacities of the legislature and a belief that law
is better off separate from politics.
Clark also resembles the American thinkers in his appeal to history.
He praises Maine for exhibiting the "true philosophical method" which
brings to bear on legal questions lessons learned from the law of more'than
one period or nation. Such a method is as useful as Austin's in combatting
useless a priori speculation because it promotes practical knowledge.1 82
Clark was careful, however, to distinguish between the general and
reasonable belief in "certain principles notions and distinctions common to
all systems of law, at least among nations which have attained any
appreciable degree of refinement and civilisation" and the a priori
speculation involved in the attempt "to make out that the common
178.
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principles obtained by the above method [of comparative jurisprudence]
are in fact necessary, as resulting from the universal nature of man." 18 3
The American theorists seem to have paid much less attention to this
distinction. For Carter especially, the message of history is uniform and
inescapable. It is as if only that one famous phrase in Maine's Ancient Law
was important: "We may say that the movement of the progressive
societies has hitherto been a movementfrom Status to Contract."'8 4 As a
speaker before the ABA stated in 1891 with specific reference to Maine's
work: "In a modern industrial state, this freedom of individual contract,
representing a long and toilsome progressive social development, becomes
essential in any rational conception of individual liberty."' 8 5
IV.

CONCLUSION

The appeal to history was the proof of the existence of inescapable law.
The course of history involved the liberation of the individual from the
trammels of status, which American thinkers equated with the power of
the state. American history provided support for such a belief. In addition,
unchanging principles were long a feature of American legal science. The
Jacksonian tradition of privilege for none identified state action with
invidious discrimination and the appropriation of public funds for private
purposes. The direct appeal to history, however, was something new, or at
least thought to be something new. The contest between analytical and
historical jurisprudence placed the entire enterprise on a new scientific
basis. The majoritarian, and therefore ultimately socialistic, implications
of positivism were disproved by Maine's historical approach.
Those who helped create the historical jurisprudence outlined above
also maintained a belief in a declaratory theory of law and judging. Like
antebellum legal scientists, advocates of historical jurisprudence spoke the
language of induction.' 86 Carter declared that "the province of science,"
including the science of law, is "rigidly confined to the observation and
orderly arrangement of facts."' 8 7 Hammond also argued that knowledge of

the law is only obtained through induction based on the cases. Accordingly,
the cases are the law because law could not ne understood without them,
but they do not make the law. "No one believes," he argued, "that the
observation and experiments by which our knowledge of physical science is
183. CLARK, supra note 176, at 203.
184. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (1963).
185. Frederick N. Judson, Liberty of Contract Under the Police Power, 14 A.B.A.
REP. 231, 233 (1891).
186. See supra note 23.
187. CARTER, supra note 21, at 219.
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constantly increasing, are so many additions to nature and its laws."'1 " He
was even more explicit in one of his notes to Lieber:
We can improve upon the fathers of the common law, not by rejecting their
belief in the existence of such a law [above the decisions themselves and
which they only reflect], but by recognizing the fact that it must be learned,
like the laws of the physical world, inductively. The decided cases of the
past are so many observations upon the practical working of these laws,
from which the true theory is to be inferred, - precisely as the astronomer
infers the true form of the planet's orbit from his observations of its position
at many different times. The observed facts are authoritative: our inferences from them are theory; but it is the formation of that theory which
enables us to carry our observations on farther and more intelligently, and
thus to arrive gradually at the true understanding of the laws that govern
the moral as well as those that govern the material universe. 18 9
Cooley also asserted that judges discover law, finding the proof for
that assertion in the inductive nature of the legal process:
Every principle declared by a court in giving judgment is supposed to be a
principle more or less general in its application, and which is applied under
the facts of the case, because, in the opinion of the court, the facts bring the
case within the principle. The case is not the measure of the principle; it
does not limit and confine it within the exact facts, but it furnishes an
illustration of the principle. .

.

.Thus, one by one, important principles

become recognized, through adjudications which illustrate them, and
which constitute authoritative evidence of what the law is when other cases
shall arise.1 90
Bliss cited these passages from Cooley and Hammond to support his
assertion of the inductive nature of legal inquiry.' 9 1 Like the antebellum
legal scientists, they found the true law by induction. For some of the
writers this law expressed the mind of the creator, but for all of them its real
power came from its connection with history.
Appealing to history to support the unchanging principles of law was
useful, at least in part, because it appeared to link evolution to the science of
the law. For all these thinkers, the expression of law in rules changes as
times change. Carter blamed the seductive appeal of Bentham's foolishness on the ignorance of the pre-Darwinian world: "The law of Evolution so
dominating in its influence upon recent thought, had not been stated."' 92
188. BLACKSTONE, supra note 112, at 216 n.30.
189. LIBER, supra note 119,. at 328-29 n.N.
190. COOLEY, supra note 128, at § 10.
191. BLIss, supra note 131.
192. CARTER, supra note 21, at 268.
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Once it is understood that society evolves it becomes clear that legal rules
are the product of factors which reach far back into time and cannot be
changed by arbitrary legislation.19 3 One harried supporter of analytical
jurisprudence humorously described his dilemma in a world dominated by
ideas of slow change:
But quite certainly, in spite of all that can be urged, the cultivators of
analytical jurisprudence will still be reproached with wanting historicalmindedness, a graver charge in these days when evolution is in the very air,
- it has been humorously said, - than heresy or even petty larceny.""
Ironically, the arguments of these legal thinkers were not truly
evolutionary. All of them accept a theory of historical change based on
stages of development, much like the historical thought of the antebellum
legal scientists.19 5 Not every acknowledgement of change is evolutionary.
Perhaps Tiedeman comes closest to the evolutionary idea with his emphasis
on the law's adaptation to a changing social environment. Yet even he
asserted the unquestioned superiority of the "highest" stage of development in which laissez faire reigns. The existence of unchanging principles,
of course, also casts doubt on the evolutionary nature of this approach to
law. In spite of their rhetoric, the goal of these writers seems to be the
prevention of change, not accommodation to a changing world.
The science of law that these thinkers advocated had important
implications for the deciding of cases. Once law is based on inescapable
truths and the realm of public law is severely circumscribed, most legal
questions become questions of private law, that is, of the common law.
additionally, the identification of the unchanging dictates of the law with
the rights guaranteed, not only by the Constitution but by the "unwritten
constitution," makes it both easy and proper to decide constitutional
questions by analogy to common law concepts. As Phelps noted, once it was
established that questions of constitutional law were to be entrusted to the
judiciary and not to the political branches of government, "the simple, the
ancient, the salutary, the perfectly intelligible and just principles of the
common law became sufficient for all the purposes of constitutional
construction. "196
This use of the common law to answer questions of constitutional law
has been identified as a principal characteristic of the classical formalism
193. Id.
194. Charles Malcolm Platt, The Characterand Scope of Analytical Jurisprudence,
24 AM. L. REV. 613 (1890).
195. See supra note 23.
196. Edward J. Phelps, Chief Justice Marshall and the ConstitutionalLaw of His
Time, in ORATIONS AND ESSAYS, supra note 98, at 42.
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discussed at the outset of this article. Kennedy places special emphasis on
the integrated nature of classical thought. 197 Certain key concepts, such as
liberty of contract, were thought to supply answers to a host of legal
questions.' 98 This concept of integration, with its necessary implication
that the process of legal judgment is a mechanistic application of
unavoidable precepts, justifies the description of this type of legal reasoning as "formalistic."' ' 9 The constitutionalization of the common law
becomes the ultimate integration.
The legal theories of thinkers like Hammond, Cooley, Bliss,
Tiedeman, Phelps, Dillon, and Carter provide the basis for a "formalistic"
view of law and judging. As long as the ultimate repository of law is
declared to be a body of principles beyond the reach of political processes,
especially legislative processes, and once the guarantees of the Constitution are proclaimed to embody these unwritten principles, the decision of
cases can become the mechanical application of transcendent rules. When
the fear of socialism, so evident in all these thinkers, is joined to their view
of the nature of law, it is plausible that the law they described, practiced,
and taught was dedicated to preventing the redistribution of wealth.
On the other hand, this examination of the legal thought in the Gilded
Age does raise questions for our understanding of the period. First, some
American legal thinkers thought that law was deeply connected to history
which, to a certain extent, dictated the principles that should be used to
decide cases. They appealed not to a closed world of legal rules, not to
economic ideas, but instead to a specific legal science based on a historical
science reflecting the reality of human life.
This science, however, was not everyone's idea of science. A brief
consideration of Maine's writing reveals a strong belief in the uniformity of
human development based on the uniformity of human nature. Although
Maine criticized the fantasies of those who speculated without reference to
historical "reality," he and his American advocates apparently base their
ideas not on empirical knowledge but on a priori assumptions. Of course,
impatience with a priori reasoning in the social sciences began in the late
nineteenth century. In a sense, the legal thinkers discussed here are
representatives of a broad current of thought which is giving way to a new
197. "Kennedy characterizes classical legal consciousness as a rationalistic ordering
of the entire legal system. . . .The lynchpin of classicism was the concept that individuals,
governments, and the judiciary were the possessors of constitutionally delegated powers
absolute within their spheres. . . .[N]umerous principles, categories, and methodologies
radiated from it like spokes for the hub of a wheel." GOETSCH, supra note 3, at 90-91.
198. Id. at 19-21.
199. Goetsch, supra note 3, at 221-25; GOETSCH, supra note 3, at 87-92.
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current which will help to mark the modern intellectual world. 20 0 Perhaps
the intellectual history of American law in the Gilded Age should be tied
more closely to American intellectual history in general. 0 1
. One consequence of taking a broader view should be a closer focus on
the intellectual opponents of believers in transcendent law, the advocates of
Austinian positivism who believed in the primacy of the case as the source
of law. While this is not the place to begin such an inquiry, it is not
unreasonable to suggest that those advocates may be found among those
law teachers devoted to the case method. Maybe the usual picture of late
nineteenth century formalism has obscured the novelty of what Langdell
and his colleagues started.
Finally, the personal history of some of these writers should cause us to
reflect on the adequacy of any one explanatory theory and any attempt to
closely define a discipline called legal history. Louise Halper has thoroughly demolished the picture of Tiedeman as a consistent advocate of
laissez faire.202 Halper has shown that Tiedeman became, at the end of his
life, an advocate of government ownership of what he termed public
utilities, a classification which included the railroads, when faced with the
apparent threat to small scale enterprise posed by large accumulations of
capital. Tiedeman's advocacy is perfectly consistent with his legal theory.
According to him, the meaning of constitutional provisions as well as rights
is dependent on popular will. Regarding economic issues, the relevant
popular will is the longing for equality, requiring the government to refrain
from accentuating natural inequalities "by giving to the already stronger
the complete control of the avenues of communication and locomotion
which every one is obliged to employ. ' 20 3 Indeed, any argument that
private monopoly actually can provide services more cheaply than government monopoly is unavailing "against the sentiment that this economic
advantage has been gained by a conspicuous sacrifice of the democratic
principle of equality before the law." 20° For Tiedeman, there was more at
stake in the public controversies of his day than perfect consistency of
thought -just as there must have been more at stake for George Smith
200. EDWARD A. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973). In this
sense, Clark's comment on historical science quoted at note - above are "modern."
201. The latest discussion of these changes is DOROTHY Ross, THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE

53-97 (1991).

202. Halper, ChristopherG. Tiedeman, 'Laissez-FaireConstitutionalism'and the
Dilemmas of Small-Scale Property in the Gilded Age, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1349 (1990).
203. PURCELL, supra note 200.
204. See generally, Halper, supra note 202.
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who, in spite of his devotion to a law of rational principles, also decided that
government control was the answer to the railroad problem." 5
The jurisprudence of history and truth was but one aspect of
American legal thought in the Gilded Age. In many ways it is pre-modern,
yet it is not without some resonance for us. It was an appeal to absolutes, a
way to answer the difficult questions of what standards the law should
enforce. That is a question that still confronts us today.

205. Professor Hovenkamp has shown that economic thought about railroad regulation actually made a strong case for federal regulation of rates. See HOVENKAMP, supra
note 10, at 149-68.

